Abstract. In this paper, we present a new identity-based signature scheme with message recovery based on bilinear map. Our scheme is proved secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen message and ID attack under the random oracle model. This new scheme shortens the total length of the original message and the appended signature and adapts to the ubiquitous network scenario very well.
Introduction
In ubiquitous computing, the bandwidth of ubiquitous network is usually constrained, so it is desirable to shorten the total length of the original message M and the appended signature x. In this research area, there are two kinds of ideas adopted: one which is to directly produce short signature for message M , the other which is to "fold"part of message into the signature in such a way that it is "recoverable "by the verifier (i.e, signature scheme has the partial message recovery property). The former is taken by schemes proposed by D.Boneh et al. [10] , F.Zhang et al. [11] , D.Boneh and X.Boyen [12] and so on. In this paper, we mainly focus on the latter. On the whole, the existing digital signatures with message recovery may be classified into two types: RSA-based schemes and discrete-logarithm-based schemes. PSS-R [3] and ISO/IEC 9796-1,9796-2 are signature schemes with message recovery in the RSA type. The Nyberg-Rueppel [4, 5, 6] , Miyaji [7] and Okamoto et al. [9] schemes are in DL (discrete logrithm) type.
The concept of identity-based cryptography was proposed in 1984 by Shamir [14] . The idea behind identity-based cryptography is that the user's public key can be derived from arbitrary string (e-mail address, IP address combined to a user name, social security number,...) which identifies him in a non ambiguous way. This greatly reduces the problems with key management. This kind of system needs trusted authority called private key generator (PKG) whose task is to compute user's private key from user's identity information (users do not generate their key pairs themselves). Several practical identity-based signature schemes [1, 2, 13] have been devised since 1984, but no identity-based signature scheme with message recovery goes out into the world until the scheme proposed by F.Zhang et al. [15] in 2005. F.Zhang et al. didn't quantify the security of their signature schemes in [15] . In addition, there are some problems occur in F.Zhang et al.'s schemes (see section 3) .
In this paper, we present a new identity-based signature scheme with message recovery based on bilinear map, referred to as IDSMR. Its security is based on Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption, CDH for short. IDSMR can deal with any message with arbitrary length.
Signature schemes from three move identification schemes such as Fiat-Shamir [1] are a typical class of practical signature schemes. To prove the security of such a class of signature schemes, K. Ohta and T. Okamoto presented a new key technique "ID reduction", in which the identification scheme corresponding to the signature scheme was used. In [8] , K. Ohta and T. Okamoto thought that ID reduction technique had advantage over the previous technique, "forking lemma", by Pointcheval and Stern [16] , and partly owed the advantage of ID reduction technique over forking lemma to the case that analyzing the identification scheme corresponding to the signature scheme was easier than analyzing the signature scheme. To prove that IDSMR is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and ID attack under the random oracle model, we make use of the ID reduction Technique and the results in [8, 9] . The paper will proceed as follows. In section 2, we review some preliminaries used throughout this paper. In section 3, we review and analyse F.Zhang et al.'s schemes. In section 4, we present our signature scheme with message recovery. In section 5, we give security analysis of IDSMR. In section 6, we compare our scheme with other schemes. Section 7 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries

Notations
Throughout this paper, we will use the following notations. |q| denotes the length of q in bit. If |q| = 0, q is denoted as ∅. Z + denotes the set of natural numbers and {0, 1} * denotes the the space of finite binary strings. Let [m] l1 denote the most significant l 1 bits of m and [m] l2 denote the least significant l 2 bits of m. We denote by a||b the string which is the concatenation of strings a and b. We also denote [x]= y if y ≤ x < y + 1 and y ∈ Z + . a b denotes the bitwise XOR of bit strings a and b. If G is a group and P ∈ G, (P ) 2 denotes the binary string representation of P .
Bilinear Map
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group, whose order is a prime p, and G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order p. Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear map with the following properties: 
k2 are four cryptographic hash functions -Extract: A user submits his/her identity information ID to PKG. PKG computes the user's public key as Q ID =H 2 (ID), and returns S ID =sQ ID to the user as his/her private key. -Sign: Let the message be m ∈ {0, 1} k2 1. Randomly choose k ∈ Z * p , and compute v= e(P, P )
The signature is (r, U ). -Verify: Given ID A , a message m, and a signature (r, U ), compute
holds. If it is correct, then accept this signature and output true. Otherwise, output ⊥.
In the above scheme, if f ∈ Z p and |f | < |p|, then, in the verification phase, we need padding (|p| − |f |)0s in the left of the binary string representation of f . Otherwise, the signature will be rejected. If f > p and |f | = |p|, we say f = p+f then, in the verification phase, we get
, so the signature will be rejected, although it is generated correctly. Zhang et al.'s second scheme for partial message recovery in [15] also suffers the similar problems.
In addition, their two schemes can't seem to deal with the message whose length in bits is less than some fixed length.
IDSMR Scheme
This section introduces our signature scheme with message recovery. It works as follows.
-Setup: Given a security parameter l ∈ Z + , the private key generator(PKG) chooses two groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order p (here, l=|p| ), a generator P of G 1 , a bilinear map e :G 1 × G 1 →G 2 . Then PKG picks a masterkey s ∈ Z * p and computes P pub = sP and w= e(P, P ). PKG also chooses cryptographic hash functions
The system's public parameters are
, Alice follows the steps below 1. Randomly choose x ∈ Z * p , and compute τ =w
6. Alice sends σ = (m 1 , r, S) to verifier Bob. -Verify: When receiving σ = (m 1 , r, S), Bob follows the steps below.
1. 
Security
In this section we prove the security of our signature scheme in the random oracle model, with CDH assumption. In order to prove the security of our signature scheme with ID reduction technique, we need to introduce an non-identity-based signature scheme, referred to as NIDS, and an identification scheme corresponding to NIDS, referred to as IFNIDS.
Attack Model for identity-based Signature Schemes
The most general known notion of security of a non-identity-based signature scheme is existential unforgery under adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-ACMA); in this model, an adversary wins the game if he outputs a valid pair of a message and a signature, where he is allowed to ask the signer to sign any message except the output. We consider the following natural generalization of this notion, which is acceptable as a standard model of security for identity-based signature schemes with message recovery.
Definition 3. An identity-based signature scheme with message recovery, which consists of four algorithms Setup, Extract, Sign, and Verify playing the same role as ours, has the existential unforgery for adaptive chosen message and ID attacks (EUF-ID-ACMA) property if no polynomial time algorithm A has a non-negligible succeed probability in the following game:
1. Challenger C runs Setup of the scheme. The resulting system parameters are given to A. that ID and (ID, m) are not equal to the input of any query to Extract and Sign, respectively. A wins the game if σ is a valid signature of m for ID.
NIDS and IFNIDIS
Descriptions of NIDS Scheme. NIDS is described by three algorithms Keygen, Sign and Verify.
-Keygen: Given a security parameter l ∈ Z + , signer S chooses the same system parameters as PKG of IDSMR except that it chooses its public key Q ID and computes its private key d ID =sQ ID , doesn't choose hash function H 1 . The system's public parameters are
, S follows the steps below 1. Randomly choose x ∈ Z * p , and compute τ =w
-Verify: When receiving σ = (m 1 , r, S), V follows the steps below:
1.
. Accept signature if and only if [f ]
[
Descriptions of IFNIDS Scheme. In IFNIDS, prover P publishes its public system parameters while keeping the corresponding secret key, and proves its identity to verifier V. Here hash functions F 1 , F 2 are shared by P and V. IFNIDS works as follows.
-Keygen: Given a security parameter l ∈ Z + , prover P chooses its public key Q ID , computes its private key d ID =sQ ID , chooses the same system parameters as signer S of NIDS except that it doesn't choose hash function H 2 . The system's public parameters are P aram={p,G 1 ,G 2 , e,P ,P pub ,Q ID , w,F 1 , F 2 } -Identification Protocol: P proves its identity and V checks the validity of P' proof as follows:
) and generates r as follows:
Here x ∈ Z * p is uniformly selected. P sends (r, m 1 ) to verifier V. (2) V generates random challenge u ∈ Z * p and sends it to P. [(l+1)/2] = F 1 (m 2 ) holds or not, where
Security of NIDS and IFNIDS.
In order to analyze the security of NIDS and IFNIDS, we firstly introduce the following notions similar to those [8, 9] . Here we assume all hash functions are modeled as random oracles. Due to lack of space, the proof of the above theorem is omitted in this version of the paper. The basic idea of proof is to use boolean matrix and heavy row introduced [9] and is similar to that of proof on Lemma 4 in [9] .
Security of IDSMR
In order to analyze security of IDSMR, we introduce the following quantifiable notions.
Definition 10. An EUF-ID-ACMA adversary A breaks IDSMR with ( t, q sig , q H1 , q H2 , q F1 , q F2 , ) if and only if A queries Extract at most q E times, queries Sign at most q sig times, queries hash functions H 1 , H 2 , F 1 , F 2 at most q H1 , q H2 , q F1 , q F2 times respectively, and can forge a signature of IDSMR within time t with success probability greater than .
The following theorem shows the relation between IDSMR and NIDS in security. Proof. We show how to construct an EUF-ACMA adversary A 1 that uses A 0 to gain advantage 0 (1 − 1/p)/q H1 against NIDSMR. The game between the challenger and A 1 starts with the challenger first generating random public system parameters P aram={p, G 1 , G 2 , e, P , P pub ,Q ID w, H 2 , F 1 , F 2 } (Here P pub = sP ,Q ID ∈ G 1 ), and a private key d ID = sQ ID . The challenger gives P aram to algorithm A 1 . The algorithm A 1 interacts with A 0 as follows and maintains list L 1 that is initially empty and is used to keep track of answers to queries asked by A 0 to oracle H 1 , and challenger maintains lists L 2 , L 3 and L 4 that are initially empty and are used to keep track of answers to queries asked by A 0 to oracle H 2 , F 1 and F 2 .
Theorem 12. In the random oracle model, suppose that an EUF-ID-ACMA adversary
-Setup: The algorithm A 1 gives the algorithm A 0 the system parameters {p, If an entry for the query is found, the same answer will be given to A 1 ; otherwise, a randomly generated value will be used as an answer to A 1 , the query and the answer will then be stored in the list. 
Since i is independently and randomly chosen, we have
A 1 's failure during simulation is caused by A issuing a private query to ID i , we have
Therefore, we have
Combing theorem 9 and 12 and lemma 8, we have 
Comparison of Schemes
In table 1 below, we compare our scheme with schemes [13, 15, 17, 18] in terms of the total length of the original message and the appended signature, and the number of the dominant operations required by them. In table we use mls , exps, and pcs as abbreviations for point multiplications in G 1 , exponentiations in G 2 and computations of bilinear map respectively. 
Conclusion
This paper presented a signature scheme with message recovery. It is proved to be secure in the strongest sense(i.e., existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message and ID attacks) in the random oracle model under the CDH assumption. Furthermore, our scheme can deal with any message with arbitrary length and shortens the length of the original message and the appended signature by "folding"part of message into the signature.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank anonymous referees for their helpful comments.
